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Abstract: Financial crises have had a decisive influence on banking
regulations in Spain. During the mid-19th century the publication of
the financial statements of banks was considered key to the stability
of the financial system. All new joint stock banking companies were
to publish their statements in the Madrid Gazette in return for the
privilege of limited liability. Similar obligations were placed on issu-
ing banks. The copious publication of financial statements coincided
with a period of financial prosperity. However, the crises that fol-
lowed from 1864 to 1868 led to a reduction in the official publication
of statements. This paper is concerned with an early response to
crises in financial reporting. The study focuses on the relationship
between the publication of accounting statements by banks and the
GDP in Spain during the mid-19th century. The results suggest that
the frequency of publication of financial statements may be an indica-
tor of economic performance.
INTRODUCTION
As Hernández [1996a, p. 92] has noted, the ideas that
helped to shape modern-day accounting in Spain originated in
the 19th century. A number of short papers on accounting regu-
lation in 19th century Spain have been published [Goxens,
1985; Fernández, 1988; Giner, 1993]. Explanations for change
and the political, economic and social contexts in which it oc-
curred have also been analyzed [Bernal, 2000]. Annisette and
Macías [2002] revealed the financial reporting practices of the
Banco de España. However, none of these contributions have
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investigated changes in the accounting regulation of joint stock
banking companies as a response to crises. Neither has there
been any research into the relationship between financial dis-
closure and the trajectory of the economic cycle in mid-19th
century Spain.
Kindleberger [1978] views the financial crisis of the 19th
century as a key turning point in the business cycle and as the
inevitable consequence of the preceding boom. He stresses the
role of adverse expectations, forced liquidation and debt defla-
tion. It has often been suggested that accounting regulation has
changed as a response to financial crises and scandals [Previts
and Merino, 1979, pp. 270-276; Merino and Neimark, 1982, p.
45; Walker, 1996, pp. 312-319; Bernal, 2000]. The shock effect of
financial scandal has long been the catalyst for convincing legis-
lators, businessmen and accountants of the need for reform
[Edwards, 1996, pp. 66-67].
In Victorian Britain the lack of compulsory financial disclo-
sure pertaining to manufacturing concerns contrasted with the
reporting practices of public utilities, insurance companies,
banks, and railroads, whose activities were more closely regu-
lated and reported [Hawkins, 1963, p. 137]. Parker [1990, p. 69]
explains the differential treatment of public utilities and regu-
lated companies as being “for reasons of monopoly, privilege
and safety, not just, or even primarily, for the protection of
shareholders”. The British Parliament was not slow to legislate
for increased disclosure in the case of particular sectors of the
economy, especially where public interest had been aroused as a
consequence of financial scandals, such as the City of Glasgow
crash in 1878 [Napier and Noke, 1992, pp. 37-38; Walker,
1998].1 Conversely, Bordo [1986, p. 191] argues that one of the
key elements of a financial crisis is the fact that “Runs on par-
ticular banks . . . could lead to a general banking panic, where
the public at large, fearful of suffering severe losses on their
deposits should the banks fail, or of paying a premium on cur-
rency in the event of a suspension of payments, attempts to
convert deposits into currency”. This situation can result in a
significant reduction in the official publication of financial
statements.
1 Similarly, McCartney and Arnold [2002, pp. 401-417] have discussed
changes in reporting practices by railway companies during the mid-19th cen-
tury and provoked a re-examination of ideas about the impact of crises on
financial reporting.
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In this paper, I examine the essential features of the finan-
cial crises that occurred in Spain between 1844 and 1868, their
influence on accounting regulation, and the publication of fi-
nancial statements of the joint stock banking companies in the
Madrid Gazette. The extent to which the volume of accounting
publications was related to the level of economic activity is also
explored. The study is based on the financial statements of bank
and credit institutions published in the Madrid Gazette, 1844-
1868 (8,760 bulletins). This period coincided with the reign of
Isabel II, enabling an analysis of the reasons and consequences
of the different accounting regulations that were passed under
that regime. A series of financial statements of the numerous
banks and credit institutions operating during the time were
analyzed.
The findings reveal that the financial crises which occurred
in mid-19th century Spain had a significant impact on the regu-
lation and the financial disclosure practices of joint stock bank-
ing companies. As these new companies had the privilege of
limited liability and the issuing banks had the right to issue
notes, the publication of statements in the official government
newspaper, the Madrid Gazette, was deemed necessary. Hitherto
bankers were perceived as a form of trading concern [García
López, 2000], subject to the rules of the Commercial Code, 1829
[Blanco, 1980; Hernández, 1996b]. Under this arrangement ac-
counting information was confidential, although its disclosure
and examination could be ordered in the event of proceedings in
relation to succession or insolvency. Banks only published ac-
counting information when obliged to do so by the state, and
additional voluntary disclosures were seldom made.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section explores
the background to bank disclosure practices in Spain. There
follows a review of the financial statements of the joint stock
banking companies and the impact of financial crises; an analy-
sis of published financial statements, 1844-1855, a period when
the creation of banks was very restrictive; an analysis of pub-
lished accounts, 1856-1868, when the policy towards bank for-
mation was more expansive. Then follows an examination of the
correlation between the frequency of publication of financial
statements and GDP in order to discover whether the extent of
disclosure indicated greater macro-economic activity. This
analysis of the correlation between financial disclosure and the
Spanish GDP suggests that the frequency of publication of fi-
nancial statements could be interpreted as an indicator of subse-
quent economic performance.
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ANTECEDENTS
In 1833 the London Gazette began the monthly publication
of notes in circulation issued by the Bank of England and the
country banks in Britain [Gilbart, 1837, pp. 95-99]. However,
the publication of statements about the assets and liabilities of
the issuers and banking departments of the Bank of England,
commonly called “the bank return”, did not begin until the
Joint-Stock Banks Regulation Act, 1844 required the publication
of those statements [Parker, 1990; Jones and Aiken, 1994; With-
ers, 1910, pp. 70-71].2 These disclosures increased the trust of
the shareholders and the public and reduced the risk of bank-
ruptcy of the joint-stock banks [Mill, 1848, p. 138].3
Courcelle-Seneuil [1857, pp. 289-299] states that a law in
Massachusetts, 1829 obliged banks to periodically submit finan-
cial statements to the governor and arrange for their publica-
tion. Tucker [1839, p. 212] suggested that the American banks
had become sensible of the advantages of publication experi-
enced in Britain. In the same vein, Duncombe [1841, p. 244]
indicated that the frequent publishing of statements by the
American banks, together with the reports of the state directors
following their examination and supervision of the institutions,
would enable the public to understand the business of the bank,
and to approve or disapprove of the measures taken by the di-
rectors.
In Spain, only the Banco Nacional de San Carlos was orga-
nized as a joint-stock company, in 1782.4 In 1829 it was liqui-
dated and became the Banco de San Fernando. The Royal De-
cree of 12 July 1829 determined that the liquidation statements
of the bank, with the table of the dividend and the state of the
reserved fund, would be printed every six months, and copies
distributed to any shareholders requesting them. Tedde [1999, p.
32] points out that on 10 July 1832 a Commission postponed the
second issue of notes until a statement of the funds of the Banco
de San Fernando, its operations and results were agreed at the
first general meeting and disclosed in order for the public to
verify the soundness of the institution. However, in March 1833,
2 The Parliamentary Commission created to investigate the crisis of 1837,
attributed to the excessive issue of notes of the private and commercial banks,
recommended the periodical publication of the assets and liabilities of banks
[Arrazola et al, 1852, pp. 468-469]. Gilbart [1837, pp. 99-101] highlighted the
disadvantages of publishing the balances of the private banks.
3 This opinion was incorporated in the sixth edition [1865].
4 On early accounting by the Banco de San Carlos see Hernández [1989].
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it was agreed to stop publishing the annual balance sheet of the
bank to maintain secrecy with respect to “the chest where the
mystery of the credit must be enclosed . . . a mystery that if
published destroys its virtue” [Tortella, 1973, p. 29].
It was also established that the management of the Banco
de San Fernando would be inspected by a commissioner, a royal
appointee paid for by the bank. The commissioner was required
to be a civil servant with sound financial knowledge. The ap-
pointment of a commissioner by royal appointment would fea-
ture in all the subsequent laws creating issuing banks. The
commissioner’s object was to scrutinize the books, registers and
entries to guarantee the legality of the bank’s operations, and to
examine the report and balance sheet to be presented at the
shareholders meetings, ensuring that these agreed with underly-
ing books and documents.
During the mid-19th century it was considered that publica-
tion, the existence of capital proportionate to issues of notes5
and the verification of banking activity by competent inspectors,
were essential to the stability of the financial system [Villaumé,
1857, p. 238].
FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE ACCOUNTING REGULATION
OF JOINT STOCK BANKING COMPANIES
Although Spain was one of the cradles of liberalism during
the 19th century, a stable political system could not be created
and sustained in that country. During the reign of Isabel II
(1843-1868) heated political dispute took place between two lib-
eral factions: the moderados and the progresistas. Government
was characterized by a high degree of state control [Artola,
1973, p. 212]. The economic situation was greatly influenced by
the budgetary imbalances, which resulted from massive military
spending during the 1793-1815 period. The country’s impover-
ished state and the loss of colonies following the Spanish-Ameri-
can Wars of Independence (1810-1826) exacerbated the finan-
cial problems [Tortella, 1994, p.162]. However, from 1844 until
the financial crisis of 1847 a period of growth ensued. This coin-
cided with the end of the civil war and the expansion of the
international economy.
5 Capie and Wood [1999, p. 4] suggest that the crises of 1847, 1857 and 1866
revealed the need to increase bank reserves in order to improve their protection
during the financial crises.
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In this period of economic well-being tradesmen and busi-
nessmen promoted joint stock banking companies. The object
was to issue notes, thus securing the same rights as the Banco
de San Fernando, the only issuing bank. In 1844 the Banco de
Isabel II in Madrid and the Banco de Barcelona obtained this
privilege, followed by the Banco de Cádiz in 1847.
Through the Law of 1 May 1844, the Banco de Barcelona
was created. Its charters established that a double issue of notes
was permissible when the “public had an exact knowledge of the
sound bases that the credit of the bank rested upon”. The Bank
commenced activity on 1 September 1845. Its first report in-
cluded a statement of operations and a balance sheet as at 31
January 1846. This would be published in the Barcelona news-
papers and in the Madrid Gazette, where it was stated that the
sound functioning of the bank was based on public knowledge
of its operations. Under a Royal Decree of 25 February 1847 the
Banco de San Fernando and the Banco de Isabel II merged. The
government determined that the accounts of the merged bank
would be published at specified intervals in the Madrid Gazette.
The Royal Order of 25 July 1847 approving the charters of
the Banco de Cadiz established that the accounts of the bank
were to be distributed to the shareholders, published in the
Madrid Gazette and in the bulletin of the province of Cadiz. The
Royal Order of 14 November 1848 also determined that the
bank had to submit a statement, according to a model deter-
mined by the Treasury, every fifteen days, specifying the stock
that it had in expired bills, and bills not collected or protested
[Ruiz, 1977, p. 69].
The Crisis of 1847: The international crisis of 1847 affected
Spain “violently” [Sardá, 1948, pp. 91-97]. Its nature was two-
fold: agricultural, linked to the scarcity of cereals; and financial,
caused by the rise in the price of silver. In Spain there was a
great shortage of metals which increased the restriction on
credit [Tortella, 1994, p. 176] resulting in financing difficulties
for the state and the private sector. The nominal capital of the
companies in the trade register of Madrid fell from an annual
mean of 2,719.5 million “reales” in 1845-1846 to 554.9 million
“reales” in 1847-1848 [Martín, 1993]. The majority of companies
in the financial and insurance sector disappeared [Tedde, 1999,
pp. 136-137].
The international crisis hastened approval of a law regulat-
ing companies on 17 February 1848. This imposed tight restric-
tions on the creation of issuing banks and reinforced inspection
6
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and publication requirements. The Royal Order of 31 July 1848
emphasized that the main objective of the Law for the Regula-
tion of Share Companies was to impose strict administrative
order on companies and thereby protect the shareholders and
those contracting with the company. This could only be guaran-
teed by frequent inspection and making operations visible
through publicity. Such regulation was perceived as the price of
limited liability. As a company was only liable in its contracts to
the limit of share capital it was fair that those who contracted
with it should know the limit of this guarantee.
The special characteristics of the issuing banks led the gov-
ernment to formulate specific regulations. This was especially
the case with the most important bank, the Banco de San
Fernando. An attempt was made in mid-1848 to tackle the dis-
credit of its notes. The Royal Order of 21 June6 required the
publication in the Madrid Gazette of the amount, series and
numbers of all notes in order to reduce the number of notes in
circulation [Arrazola et al, 1852, pp. 488-489]. An Order of 7
December 1849 determined that, within the first ten days of
each month, the Governor of the Bank would send to the Trea-
sury a statement declaring the operations of the previous
month, the situation on the last day of the month, and the move-
ment of notes and shares.
Further, the Law of 15 December 1851 reorganized the
Banco de San Fernando and obliged the publication in the Mon-
day issue of the Madrid Gazette of a statement showing notes in
circulation, deposits, current accounts and stock, both in cash
and gold or silver bars, and in fixed term current values and
current values of probable execution in 90 days. Santillan, the
Bank Governor, presented the first such statement on 16 Febru-
ary 1852 [Massa, 1858, p. 716]. He indicated that the form and
content of the statement detailed the assets and liabilities of the
Bank according to the practice of disclosing information to the
board, which from hereon would be revealed to the public.
Santillan added that the statement would not “extend to a
greater number of entries without the risk of leading to faults or
inexact appreciations . . . Now the statement must also include
the debits for capital and profits, as well as the securities, which
must face up to these interior obligations of the Bank, and due
to their nature, not demandable”. He concluded by relating diffi-
culties in relation to credits and the need to “accept them for the
6 See Santillan [1865, pp. 279-280].
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value that corresponds to a prudential estimation” [Massa, 1858,
p. 716].7
At the start of 1856 a Law of Issue Banks was approved,
whereby the Banco de San Fernando became the Banco de
España. At the same time a number of banks in the main towns
were organized as joint stock companies and had the power to
develop their activities in the same way as the banks of
Barcelona and Cadiz, that is, under the control of the govern-
ment, through a commissioner. However, a limit was placed on
their activity through the requirement that the whole capital of
the bank was to be deposited in cash. Although no limit was
imposed on the issue volume, they were forbidden to make
loans guaranteed by their own shares, or to overdraw or negoti-
ate in government securities. In addition, they were obliged to
publish statements each month8 in the government Gazette in a
manner prescribed by the Treasury. This system was in force
until 1874, when the majority of the banks ceased operating
because an issue monopoly was granted to the Banco de España
[Tedde, 1997, p. 378].
In the debate about the draft Law of Issue Banks, the
deputy, Avecilla, outlined the action necessary to protect the
wider interest: “The Government needs to exercise a tutorship
and protective influence for the public interest and for the Bank
. . . luckily the first guarantee is that the whole capital of the
Bank should be in cash. A second guarantee, which is enor-
mous, consists of ordering the Debit and Credit statement to be
published in the official newspapers, as well as the balance of all
the operations, and for the public through that means, to be able
to know the state of the operations of that establishment; and
the third guarantee is that the Government will appoint the gov-
ernors of the Banks” [Diario de las Sesiones de las Cortes
Constituyentes 1854-1856, 15 January 1856, No. 288, p. 9883].
Credit Institutions: Also in 1856 the Law of Credit Institution
Companies was approved with the aim of fostering industrial
development. The credit institution has its origins in France,
7 In the Royal Order of 18 February 1852 it was determined that the format
sent on the 16th to the Treasury should be maintained.
8 This is contained, in the Charters of the following Banks: Banco de Malaga
(Royal Order of 28 June 1856), Banco de Sevilla (Royal Order of 1 December
1856), Banco de Valladolid (Royal Order of 1 May 1857), Banco de Zaragoza
(Royal Order of 14 May 1857), Banco de Santander (Royal Order of 16 May 1857)
and Banco de Bilbao (Royal Order of 19 May 1857).
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though banks for promoting industrial development were cre-
ated earlier elsewhere, such as the Société Générale in Brussels
and the Seehandlung in Berlin [Landes, 2000, p. 246]. During
the debate on the Law of Credit Institution Companies,9 the
deputy, Mariategui, argued that the publication of financial
statements was in the public interest.
In Spain credit institutions were enabled to devote them-
selves to an extensive range of financing activities with the ex-
ception of note issue. Thus they were able to carry out dis-
counts, loans to promote firms, advance payments to the
government and issue short-term bonds. In short, they acted as
deposit, discount and investment banks. The government was
empowered to approve the creation of credit institutions by
royal decree and had a right of immediate inspection. In addi-
tion, article 8 of the law required the monthly publication of
financial statements in the Madrid Gazette and also to provide,
whenever the government requested, cash statements, portfolio
and summaries of operations.10 The government could also ex-
amine, whenever it deemed advisable, the operations and ac-
counts of the companies, and verify the state of their deposits.11
For this purpose the companies had to present all books, docu-
ments and securities. All these duties would be referred to in the
Charters establishing the credit institutions.12
The growth of the credit institutions was impressive. In
barely ten years, 34 institutions were created.13 Under the Law
they were free to adopt the liquidity and investment policy that
9 The Draft Law extended the concessions made to the credit institutions to
the railroad companies [Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes 1854-
1856, 18 June 1856, No. 392, pp. 14294-14295].
10 In the debate on this article concern for the interests of the shareholders
and the public was expressed [Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes
1854-1856, 17 January 1856, No. 291, pp. 9958-9961].
11 Cameron [1971, pp. 141-143] points out how, during the creation of the
Société Générale de Crédit Mobilier in 1852, members of the French Govern-
ment had requested the inclusion of this institution in the tax system and con-
trol by government. This would be enforced by an obligation to send periodical
financial statements to several government offices and in the examination of the
company books by a representative from the Treasury.
12 Examples of this include: Crédito Mobiliario Español (Royal Order of 22
March 1856), Española Mercantil e Industrial (Royal Order of 2 April 1856),
Compañía General de Crédito de España (Royal Order of 26 April 1856), Catalana
General de Crédito (Royal Order of 30 April 1856) and Crédito Mobiliario
Barcelonés (Royal Order of 28 June 1856).
13 On the spatial distribution and origin of capital, see Sánchez-Albornoz
[1968].
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most suited them. Some, such as the Crédito Mobiliario
Español, had an investment portfolio that included railroads,
insurance, urban services, real estate construction, national and
foreign public debt and investments in French firms [Tedde,
1997, p. 380].
The new legislation on credit companies and a Railroad
Law of 1855 encouraged the creation of a large number of com-
panies. The government did not have sufficient trained person-
nel to perform statutory inspection of the growing number of
companies. One commentator, Deputy Gaminde, also observed
that the inspectors did not have sufficient accounting knowl-
edge.14
The Crisis of 1857-1858: Limited economic recovery during
1849-1852 was disrupted by political and financial turmoil in
1853-1854. Weak governments and corruption scandals at the
highest levels of the state precipitated the revolution of 185415
and rendered unstable the government of the progresistas until
July of 1856. In 1857 a new international crisis coincided with
the effects of an abysmal cereal harvest in 1856-1857. The scar-
city of cereals increased the chronic trade deficit and encour-
aged the release of monetary metals abroad. The effect of these
adversities was partly offset by the increase in fiduciary circula-
tion associated with economic activity generated by the banking
and railway laws [Sánchez-Albornoz, 1977, pp. 27-67].
In response to the financial crisis of 1857 the Spanish gov-
ernment attempted to bolster the inspection of share companies.
A Regulation of 12 December 1857 established that in addition
to a journal, ledger and an inventory record, firms would also
keep a share transfer book, a minute book of general meetings,
and any other books “advisable for better accounts and order”.
It was established that having carried out checks, which in-
cluded particular scrutiny of the existence of shares that the
executives should have in “guarantee of their management”, a
copy of the financial statements for each quarter would be sent
to the government, as well as a report on the recent trading and
state of the company.
14 See Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes 1854-1856 [17 January
1856, No. 291, p. 9959].
15 The revolution of 1854 resurrected the hopes, foregone in the 1848 revolu-
tion, of the European revolutionaries, inspiring Marx and Engels to write Revo-
lution in Spain. See also Kiernan [1966].
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In the years immediately following the crisis efforts were
made to generate sufficient resources to finance industrializa-
tion and, above all, the construction of the railway network.
Political stability was maintained from 1859 until 1863. This
prosperity was only partly disrupted by the effects of the Ameri-
can Civil War.16
The Crisis of 1865-1868: By the end of 1864 economic expansion
slowed. Expectations of high profits in the railways sector disap-
peared once the main lines were constructed and income was
insufficient to cover the payment of minimum guaranteed inter-
est. The risks assumed by the railway companies and, above all,
by the credit institutions, which possessed the majority of their
shares and bonds, together with the financing needs of a bank-
rupt government, caused a fall in security bonds and the subse-
quent restriction of both national and foreign credit to the pri-
vate sector. This incited the bankruptcy of many of the newly
created credit institutions [Sánchez-Albornoz, 1963, 1967]. The
greatest panic took place in May 1866 and coincided with an
international financial crisis following the closure of Overend,
Gurney & Co. in London. This crisis affected Spanish industry
and trade, and together with the bad harvests of 1867 and 1868,
resulted in social and political unease. These events culminated
in the revolution of September 1868 and the dethronement of
Isabel II.
Santillán [1996, p. 462] has highlighted inefficiencies in the
system of inspection conducted by commissioners under royal
appointment or government delegates, in preventing abuses in
the banks and credit institutions. These inefficiencies must have
become more evident as the economic situation in Spain wors-
ened. Tortella [1973, pp. 254-274] shows that during the first six
months of 1864 ten credit institutions and four issue banks were
opened. However, from October onwards, the Compañía Gen-
eral de Crédito, the Banco de Valladolid and the local credit
institutions went into receivership, due to corruption scandals.
The government’s reply was to approve the Regulation for the
Inspection of Joint Stock Credit Institutions of 30 July 1865.
This Regulation was speedily developed from the Budget Law of
15 July. The reasons for the Law indicated that the existing
inspection regime had not prevented abuses. The shareholders
16 During May 1861 the customers of the Banco de España queued at its
doors to withdraw their funds [Santillán, 1865, pp. 207-208].
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had also been shown to be apathetic in protecting their inter-
ests.
The Regulation of 30 July 1865 required the banking and
credit institution companies to compile financial statements,
which revealed their financial status and disclosed cash, portfo-
lios and a summary of their operations. Once examined these
statements were to be sent monthly, via the General Inspector,
to the Treasury. In addition, a civil servant prepared a quarterly
summary of the state of the company. These summaries were
also published. Further, companies were obliged to submit a
literal copy of the minutes of shareholders meetings, the general
balance statements together with the necessary notes and expla-
nations, and reports and documents referred to in general meet-
ings.
The inspection model for banks and credit institutions in-
troduced by the Regulation of 30 July 1865 was that already
applied to companies granted public works following the issue
of bonds.17 The main difference was that a particular inspector
was not allocated to a specific company, leaving the sharehold-
ers the task of watching over their interests and of monitoring
the managers of the company. The inspection was to be carried
out by special inspectors and delegates. These were public em-
ployees who were expected to hold degrees or doctorates in ad-
ministration or jurisprudence.
The inspectors were required to examine the monthly finan-
cial statements, the cash statements, and portfolio and opera-
tions summaries. Inspectors could make regular or extraordi-
nary visits and seek explanations about any aspect of the
financial statements. During ordinary visits, the inspectors were
to audit bonds, check cash counts with great care, as well as
ensuring the accuracy of the balance statements that were sent
to the Treasury following approval at the general meeting. Care
was also to be taken that the issues of bonds were in due propor-
tion to the capital realized, and did not exceed legally estab-
lished limits. Inspectors were also bound to examine operations
such as loans on the bank’s shares and the acquisition of govern-
ment securities. Another of the inspectors’ tasks was to check
that the company had not distributed dividends on the basis of
profits not realized, and that the administrators had deposited
their shares in guarantee of their management. The results of
17 Royal Order of 17 February 1862. [Colección Legislativa de España,
Volumen LXXXVII, pp. 188-189].
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the inspection visits were to be notified as quickly as possible,
and the discovery of offences reported immediately.
Whenever an extraordinary visit was made, the inspector or
delegate had to prepare a statement or balance sheet and draft
reports in accordance with the books of account. If the govern-
ment considered it in the interests of the shareholders or the
public the results of such visits could be published in the Madrid
Gazette. If an inspector did not fulfill his tasks notice of his
removal from office was published in the Gazette.
To summarize. In the period studied, the three main finan-
cial crises that took place in Spain resulted in regulatory change
in financial reporting and inspection. The financial crisis of
1847-1848 precipitated the Law and Regulation of Share Com-
panies, 1848; the agricultural and financial crisis of 1857-1858
was associated with the Regulation for the Inspection of Share
Companies, 1857; and the financial crisis of 1865-1868 encour-
aged the formulation of the Regulation for the Inspection of
Joint Stock Credit Institutions, 1865.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PUBLISHED IN
THE MADRID GAZETTE, 1844-1855
This section of the paper examines the publication of the
financial statements of banks from 1844 to 1855, the period in
which the policy towards the creation of new banks was highly
restrictive. As revealed in Table 1 disclosures increased mark-
edly from the later 1840s.
No uniformity18 has been observed in the use of account
names and the order in which account categories were pre-
sented in the financial statements published by the banks. The
use of the same account name by different banks does not imply
identical meaning. As a result comparisons of the financial af-
fairs of any two banks are problematical. This lack of uniform
presentation is, perhaps, to be expected given the limited theo-
retical development of Spanish accounting at the time.19
The statements and balance sheets of banks published in
the Madrid Gazette were structured similarly and presented in
double sided format. The statement was akin to a monthly list of
ledger balances; the balance sheet was in the familiar traditional
format. It is possible that the six-month balance statement was a
18 In the UK uniformity was considered for financial institutions during the
passage of legislation relating to banks in 1879 [Parker, 1990, p. 417].
19 See, for example, Castaño [1861] and Tejedor [1876].
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basis for determining the distribution of profits, since an extract
of the profit and loss account was included. The statements
were aimed at informing the public of the situation of the bank,
especially in relation to: whether the limits of issue and mini-
mum cash requirements were fulfilled, the amount of loans in
relation to shares, and the recoverability and value of doubtful
debts.
As can be seen, the Banco de San Fernando only offered
information to the public following the years of financial insta-
bility, 1847 and 1848. Weekly circulation statements of notes
and coins were only published in the Madrid Gazette for 14
weeks during 1849-1851. After February 1852 the publication of
the weekly balance sheets referred to in the Law of 15 December
1851 commenced. These were published in the Gazette without
interruption from 1852 to 1855. It should be pointed out that
TABLE 1
Number of Financial Statements of Banks Published in the
Madrid Gazette, 1844-1855
Banco de Banco de Banco de Cádiz
San Fernando  Barcelona
Balance Notes in Balance Balance Statements Bank
sheets circulation sheets sheets of situation operations20
and cash
1844 — — — — — — —
1845 — — — — — — —
1846 — — 1 — — — 1
1847 — — — — — — —
1848 — — — 2 — 6 8
1849 — 5 5 1 10 6 27
1850 — 4 14 2 23 3 46
1851 — 5 10 _ 18 4 37
1852 37 1 7 1 15 6 67
1853 47 — 8 1 9 — 65
1854 47 — 6 2 7 — 62
1855 41 — — — — — 41
Total 172 15 51 9 82 25 354
Year Total
14
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the Banco de San Fernando, as well as being closely linked to
the government, was quoted on the Stock Exchange of Madrid.
Santillán [1865, p. 87] acknowledged that statements showing
the full financial status of the Bank were not published, adding,
“care was taken not to show the General Meeting more than
what could not be hidden”. This throws some doubt on the
quality of the information published in the Gazette.
From its inception in December 1847 the Banco de Cádiz,
published detailed six-monthly balance statements and extracts
from its profit and loss account in the Madrid Gazette. The ex-
ception being 1851. It also published fortnightly statements
from June 1849 onwards, which became monthly in 1853. In
addition, the Bank published summaries of monthly operations
from 1848 to 1852. With the onset of the government of the
progresistas, in June 1854, the Banco de Cádiz and the Banco de
Barcelona ceased publishing their financial statements until
mid-1856. Exhibit 1 provides an example of a published state-
ment for the Banco de Cádiz.
EXHIBIT 1
Financial Statement of the Banco de Cádiz, 1850
15
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BANK OF CADIZ
ASSETS LIABILITIES
12.517,500
»
13.182,729..14
»
30,00
2.809,500
»
»
1.565,804..18
494,896..6
50,000
136,279..9
30.786,711.13
7.949,120
10.848,000
793,000
10.794,674..27
»
3,454 ..15
393,353
4,143
30.786,711.13
NOTES SUMMARY
1∫ Rs. Vn. 100.000.000 nominal capital Total assets ............. Rs. Vn. 30.786,711.13
49.682, 000 i.d. of the issued shares Total liabilities ....... Rs. Vn. 30.786,711.13
2∫ The bank has an important number
of redeemed shares Equals .............. Rs. Vn »
Specification of loans on various materials
On shares various ......................................................... 1.863,500
Raw materials .................................................................. 946,000
Rs .Vn. .................... 2.809,500
16% capital paid out as per
shareholders demand .....
Total amount of bank notes
issued ...............................
Deposits ...........................
Current accounts ............
Notes payable ..................
Dividends payable ..........
Debits various .......Profits
and losses ........................
Agents of .........................
Coin in cash (in hand) ....
Bank notes in cash (in
hand) ...............................
Bill of exchanges (Bills)
and promissory notes
(IOUs) to be realized ......
Loans on precious metals
Idem on government
securities .........................
Idem on other materials,
according to separate
specifications ..................
Referred documents of
likely collection ...............
Idem of doubtful
collection .........................
Properties of the bank ....
Credits to agents .............
Idem doubtful .................
Overheads .......................
EXHIBIT 1 (continued)
Financial Statement of the Banco de Cádiz, 1850
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PUBLISHED IN
THE MADRID GAZETTE, 1856-1868
In 1856 the financial climate was favorable to a more ex-
pansive policy towards company formation. This led to the ap-
proval of the Railway Law and the Laws of Issuing Banks and
Joint Stock Credit Institutions. These encouraged the formation
of new issuing banks and credit institutions and an inflow of
foreign technical resources and capital necessary to develop the
railway network. Together with the legal obligation to disclose,
16
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the competition between financial institutions resulted in an in-
crease in the publication of accounts.
Under the Law of Issuing Banks the banks were only to
publish monthly statements. The financial statements display
relative uniformity in form and content. This is likely to have
been a response to the government’s request for a detailed bal-
ance sheet with a defined structure to facilitate inspection.21 The
information disclosed reflected the need to inspire public confi-
dence: fiduciary circulation, minimum cash requirement, cur-
rent accounts and deposits. Other operations were not detailed
and the lack of detailed disclosure relating to bank portfolios
gave rise to much concern, as this included bills and IOUs, loans
guaranteed by shares or public bills, and investments in compa-
nies [Pérez, 1991, p. 88].
The statements published by the credit institutions were
very succinct. Only four asset accounts and four liabilities ac-
counts were disclosed. These statements were not uniform with
respect to the name and ordering of the accounts. It appears
that the statements were prepared with the aim of concealing as
much information as possible. In 1858 the government prepared
a set of draft model statements, which offered greater detail and
comparability [Pérez, 1991, pp. 87-91]. However, standardiza-
tion was not achieved and credit institutions continued to pub-
lish information that only partly reflected their financial state.
Exhibit 2 reveals the limited extent of the disclosures made.
Table 2 reveals the frequency of accounting publication in
the Madrid Gazette. The issue banks and the credit institutions
regularly fulfilled the legal obligation to publish their statements
from 1856 until the end of 1864. The rate of disclosure of finan-
cial statements was 84% for the issue banks, and 77% for the
credit companies. It should be emphasized at this point that
although the publication of accounts was obligatory and an in-
spection system existed, the state had a limited capacity to force
companies to obey the rules. There were no formal penalties for
non-compliance. When a failure to disclose occurred, it was the
Treasury which published the financial statements in the Madrid
Gazette.
In 1865 the financial crisis caused panic on the stock ex-
changes in Spain22 and this extended to the banking and credit
21 This occurred due to the Order of 29 January 1863 relating to the Banks of
Cadiz, Seville and Jerez de la Frontera.
22 At this time the Stock Exchanges of Madrid and Barcelona operated. The
Banco de España, the Banco de Barcelona and the most important credit compa-
nies of those towns were quoted with various degrees of regularity.
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institutions that had to attend to queues of customers wishing to
withdraw their funds. In response the financial institutions tem-
porarily ceased the publication of their accounts. This gave rise
to mounting mistrust [Rosés, 1993, pp. 452-453]. During the
period 1865 to 1868 there were months of high rates of disclo-
sure and months when no statements were published. Overall,
the rate of disclosure in this period fell to 50% for the issue
EXHIBIT 2
Financial Statement of the
Crédito Mobiliario Español, 1856
SOCIEDAD GENERAL
DE CRÉDITO MOBILIARIO ESPAÑOL
Coins and bank notes ........................... 2.252,897 ..92
In cash ........................
Portfolio ................................................. 23.198.495..74
In other hands ............................................................................. 57.791,248..08
Various ........................................................................................ 1.049,387..76
Shares .......................................................................................... 387.600,000..76
Rs. Vn. ........................................ 471.862,020..50
Capital ......................................................................................... 456.000, 000..50
Current accounts ........................................................................ 15.862,020..50
 Rs. Vn. ....................................... 471.862,020..50
18
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banks and 47% for credit companies. The Treasury attempted to
reduce uncertainty, and in compliance with the Regulation on
the Inspection of Credit Institutions, published quarterly state-
ments for all companies, 1866-1868.
To further explore the reaction of financial institutions to
crisis a further analysis of publication patterns was performed.
This involved constructing a de-seasonalized series by means of
adjusted moving averages.23 The results are revealed in Table 3.
The data contained in Table 3 show that the lowest rates of
disclosure occurred in the second quarter of 1865 and 1866 and
in the second and fourth quarters of 1867 and 1868 (indicated in
TABLE 2
Number of Financial Statements of Banks and Credit
Institutions Published in the
 Madrid Gazette, 1856-1868
Year Banks Credit Institutions Totals
No. Statements No. Statements No. Statements
 of situation  of situation of situations
1856 4 20 6 25 10 45
1857 10 55 6 65 17 120
1858 10 101 7 57 17 158
1859 10 115 7 69 17 184
1860 10 116 7 74 17 190
1861 10 109 8 79 18 188
1862 10 120 14 99 24 219
1863 12 129 18 138 30 267
1864 20 157 25 150 45 307
1865 21 141 32 158 53 299
1866 21 104 32 203 53 307
1867 21 125 30 156 51 281
1868 21 100 27 118 48 218
Totals 1,392 1,391 2,783
23 For each month of each year the frequency of publication was calculated
by dividing the number of published statements by the number of potential
published statements. In order to determine the trend the moving averages
method is used, thereby enabling us to replace the original series with a softer
one, which is taken as a general tendency. Table 3 was obtained by dividing the
first series obtained (publication frequency) by the seasonal movement index,
thereby obtaining a de-seasonalized series.
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bold print) when the statements of the issue banks disappeared
from the Madrid Gazette. These were also the periods of deepest
financial crisis.
THE PUBLICATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
The historical dynamics of accounting publication in Spain
point to a certain relationship between the extent of publication
and the level of economic activity. We may test the hypothesis
that the number of publications is a surrogate of the financial
situation of banks. To explore this apparent relationship a series
for the arithmetic mean of the publications X (first column of
Table 4), and a series for the Gross Domestic Product at factor
cost (second column of Table 4) were compiled [Prados, 1995].
TABLE 4
Arithmetic Averages of Financial Statements Published
and Gross Domestic Product
Years X GDP(Y) GDP.X GDP(Y)2 X
1856-1857 0.469 734.8 344.6212 539,931.04 0.219961
1857-1858 0.783 773.5 605.6505 598,302.25 0.613089
1858-1859 0.694 774.1 537.2254 599,230.81 0.481636
1859-1860 0.867 813.3 705.1311 661,456.89 0.751689
1860-1861 0.9025 829.1 748.26275 687,406.81 0.814506
1861-1862 0.821 859.1 705.3211 738,052.81 0.674041
1862-1863 0.905 871.4 788.617 759,337.96 0.819025
1863-1864 0.853 881.9 752.2607 777,747.61 0.727609
1864-1865 0.783 892.3 698.6709 796,199.29 0.613089
1865-1866 0.5675 873.1 495.48425 762,303.61 0.322056
1866-1867 0.5125 824.6 422.6075 679,965.16 0.262656
1867-1868 0.4425 824.1 364.66425 679,140.81 0.195806
1868-1869 0.361 808.8 291.9768 654,157.44 0.130321
Totals 8.961 10,760.1 7,520.4936 8,933,232.4 6.625484
The data presented in the first two columns of Table 4 was
used to conduct a correlation analysis between the average bank
publications and the GDP for both the current year and the
following year. The results are shown in Table 5. This reveals
that no relation exists between the number of publications for
the current year and the GDP of the same year. However, the
analysis confirms a relationship between the average number of
21
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bank publications and the GDP for the following year. It is thus
possible to state that there is some relationship between the
average number of publications and subsequent economic
growth.
 TABLE 5
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
GDPn GDPn+1
Publn 0.089 0.394
With these results in mind, a linear regression was con-
ducted of the GDP for the 1856-1869 period in n+1 over the
number of average publications in n. The number of banks and
credit houses was used as a control variable, since the number
of financial institutions is also an indicator of economic growth,
as indicated by the correlation with the GDP (0.460). Table 6
reveals results that are highly significant (see significance of F-
statistic) and have a high explanatory power (adjusted R-square
of 0.789). Both the average publications in n and the number of
banks in n+1 are positively related with GDP+1, with both vari-
ables being highly significant (see significance of t-statistics).
The variance inflation factor (VIF) shows that no problems of co
linearity exist between the independent variables.
TABLE 6
Regression of GDPn1 on Publications and
No. of Banks and Credit Societies
Dependent variable: GDPn1
Number of obs. = 13
Model F-statistic = 23.449
Significance of F-statistic = 0.000
R-square =0.824
Adjusted R-square = 0.789
Std. Error = 21.8233
Independent Coefficient Std. Err. t-statistic Signific. VIF
variables (t-statistic)
Constant 581.972 37.181 15.652 0.000
Publn 231.405 39.205 5.902 0.000 1.448
Banksocn1 2.809 0.455 6.169 0.000 1.448
GDPn1 = Gross Domestic Product in n+1
Publn = mean publications in n
Banksocn1 = n of banks and credit societies in n+1
VIF= variance inflation factor to evaluate co linearity.
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CONCLUSIONS
The publication and inspection of statements of accounts by
joint stock banking companies in Spain was a means of provid-
ing the banking system with stability and a remedy for the ef-
fects of financial crises. This behavior followed examples set in
the US and UK.
This paper has attempted to further our understanding of
the disclosure practices of the banking sector in Spain during
the 19th century. It has been shown that in terms of the level of
disclosure (as revealed by the frequency of published statements
in the Madrid Gazette during the period when the right to issue
notes was exclusive to the Banks of San Fernando, Barcelona
and Cádiz), was irregular. The issuing banks published more
financial statements than the other credit institutions, and ad-
dressed their publications to shareholders and bondholders. In
relation to the quality of these disclosures we have found that
the information presented was not, in general, very detailed or
uniform, despite government efforts to encourage standardized
presentation.
Assuming that the publication of financial statements is a
surrogate of the financial situation of the bank, the analysis
indicates a strong relationship between sound financial situa-
tion and abundant publication, and financial crises and reduced
publication. Likewise, the study has suggested that the average
number of publications could serve as an indicator of future
economic activity in Spain during the 19th century. Throughout
the period covered by this study there was a widespread ten-
dency among banks and credit institutions not to publish their
financial statements during the year which preceded a decline in
economic activity.
Finally, the existence of a relationship between the state of
the economy and the volume of disclosure would seem to indicate
a certain strategic behavior on the part of financial entities. Un-
like other countries during the period in question, Spain had a
regulated institutional framework. However, the government
lacked the necessary means to enforce regulation and accoun-
tancy practices continued to be substantially dictated by the di-
rectors of the banking houses. The main motivation for such be-
havior was to gain or maintain the trust of the financial market.
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